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Abstract: Third party apps that work on top of per-
sonal cloud services, such as Google Drive and Drop-
box, require access to the user’s data in order to pro-
vide some functionality. Through detailed analysis of
a hundred popular Google Drive apps from Google’s
Chrome store, we discover that the existing permission
model is quite often misused: around two-thirds of an-
alyzed apps are over-privileged, i.e., they access more
data than is needed for them to function. In this work,
we analyze three di erent permission models that aim
to discourage users from installing over-privileged apps.
In experiments with 210 real users, we discover that
the most successful permission model is our novel en-
semble method that we call Far-reaching Insights. Far-
reaching Insights inform the users about the data-driven
insights that apps can make about them (e.g., their top-
ics of interest, collaboration and activity patterns etc.)
Thus, they seek to bridge the gap between what third
parties can actually know about users and users’ per-
ception of their privacy leakage. The e cacy of Far-
reaching Insights in bridging this gap is demonstrated
by our results, as Far-reaching Insights prove to be, on
average, twice as e ective as the current model in dis-
couraging users from installing over-privileged apps. In
an e ort to promote general privacy awareness, we de-
ployed PrivySeal, a publicly available privacy-focused
app store that uses Far-reaching Insights. Based on the
knowledge extracted from data of the store’s users (over
115 gigabytes of Google Drive data from 1440 users with
662 installed apps), we also delineate the ecosystem for
3rd party cloud apps from the standpoint of developers
and cloud providers. Finally, we present several general
recommendations that can guide other future works in
the area of privacy for the cloud. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first work that tackles the pri-
vacy risk posed by 3rd party apps on cloud platforms in
such depth.
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1 Introduction
Cloud services such as Google Drive, Dropbox,
OneDrive etc., have become increasingly popular in re-
cent years. At the same time, such services have raised
privacy concerns about users’ data. But the danger is
graver than it appears. While such cloud services are
few in number, and, at least, have clearly defined pri-
vacy policies, they also serve as platforms that allow a
myriad of 3rd party apps to work on top of users’ data.
These 3rd party apps provide certain functionalities for
which they require access to the users’ data. Put simply,
users sacrifice some of their privacy in order to get func-
tionalities that such apps provide. However, it appears
that often such apps acquire more data than is needed
for them to function.
As a case study, we did an analysis of a 100 third-
party apps on one of the most popular personal cloud
services, namely Google Drive (240 million active users
in 2014 [1]), and discovered that almost two-thirds
(64%) of these apps require more permissions than they
actually need for functioning. Thus, users often end up
exposing more data than is needed to unaccountable
apps. For instance, a user’s favorite PDF converter is
highly likely to get access to her music library and dis-
cover her taste in Mozart or obtain her geo-tagged pho-
tos and know where she went on the weekend. Through-
out this paper, we refer to such apps as over-privileged
apps. As observed in other 3rd party apps ecosystems,
giving such over-privileged apps superfluous access can
potentially result in users’ data being abused. This has
recently been the case in the health apps market where
the top 20 most visited apps were found to be sharing
users’ data with 70 analytics and advertising compa-
nies [2].
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Nevertheless, the cloud apps ecosystem has unique
features that warrant a particular study of this ecosys-
tem. Unlike studies on mobile app ecosystems, where the
permissions concern the user’s list of contacts, current
location, or photos, the cloud permissions allow the 3rd
party apps to get access to any file the user has stored
in the cloud. Thus, instead of profiling the current user
context, such apps can get far-reaching insights inferred
from her documents, concerning her financial, legal, or
health-related outlook for example. Put simply, the scale
and the quality of data that can be collected is both a
privacy nightmare for unaware users and a goldmine for
advertisers. Second, collecting the permissions of cloud
apps is challenging. Unlike other ecosystems where app
permissions of thousands of apps can be easily mined
via traditional web crawling, each 3rd party cloud app
has a unique interface that links to the service providers.
Hence, this limits the corpus of apps that one can study.
In this paper, we aim to dissect and mitigate the
privacy risk posed by such over-privileged 3rd party
cloud apps. We study Google Drive’s app ecosystem
from the standpoint of all relevant parties, namely, the
users, app developers and cloud providers. Generally,
we seek to characterize (a) influencing factors that can
deter users from installing over-privileged apps, (b) con-
ditions determining developers misbehavior, and (c) the
steps cloud providers can take to mitigate users’ privacy
risks. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work
that studies the privacy risk of 3rd party apps in per-
sonal cloud ecosystems.
Towards that end, we present three di erent permis-
sion models namely: (a) Delta Permissions, (b) Imme-
diate Insights, and (c) Far-reaching Insights. The first
model, i.e., Delta Permissions, informs users about the
unneeded permissions that over-privileged apps are us-
ing. The second model, Immediate Insights presents ran-
domly selected examples from the user’s data such as
portions of text or image files, photo locations etc., that
over-privileged apps can get access to. The third model,
Far-reaching Insights, has been motivated by the novel
concept of Inverse Privacy [12]. Inverse privacy refers to
the situation when a user is not aware of the informa-
tion that an external entity has about the user. Based
on this definition, Far-reaching Insights communicate
to users the inferences which can be made by the apps
with superfluous permissions using advanced text and
image analysis techniques. These include but are not
limited to user collaboration and activity patterns; the
top faces, locations, and concepts that appear in users’
photos, etc.
Overall, we make the following specific contribu-
tions in this paper:
i. Far-reaching Insights sensitize users with
intimate details, and promote privacy aware be-
havior:
Through extensive user experiments, we discover
that our first simple model, Delta Permissions fails to
deter users from installing over-privileged apps. Put
bluntly, telling users that their privacy is being in-
fringed does not help. The second model, Immediate
Insights, does twice as well in discouraging users from
installing over-privileged apps. However, the clear win-
ner is our novel model, Far-reaching Insights, which can
be twice as e ective in deterring users from installing
over-privileged apps as Immediate Insights. Overall, our
analysis reveals various factors that can deter users from
installing over-privileged apps. For instance, we discover
that within Far-reaching Insights, Relational Insights
(that reveal users’ relations with other people) reduce by
half the installation of over-privileged apps, as compared
to Personal Insights (that reveal information about the
users themselves) (Section 5).
ii. PrivySeal helps us profile developer behav-
ior and helps users safeguard their data: In an
e ort to promote privacy awareness in the general pub-
lic, and to help users safeguard their privacy, we present
PrivySeal, a privacy-focused app store that uses Far-
reaching Insights to warn users about over-privileged
apps. This store is available for public use and has been
used by over 1440 registered users. A considerable frac-
tion of these users has prior experience of using Google
Drive 3rd party apps. By automatically getting their
previously installed apps’ metadata, we anatomize cur-
rent developers’ behavior, point towards potential av-
enues of misbehavior, and present suggestions to deter
misbehavior (Sections 7 and 8).
iii. Shared wisdom: Finally, based on our analysis
we present several easy to implement practical sugges-
tions that can be adopted by cloud providers and by
those others working in the domain of privacy to safe-
guard users privacy in the cloud (Section 8).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the 3rd party cloud app ecosystem,
its threat model, and the specific case of Google Drive.
In Section 3, we describe in detail our privacy app per-
missions review process and results. In Section 4, we
present our three permission models, before evaluating
them in Section 5. Based on the privacy-focused store
we have developed (Section 6), we analyze app developer
behavior in Section 7. Finally, we give our recommen-
dations for the community in Section 8.
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2 Third-party Cloud Apps
Ecosystem
There are three entities that interact in the 3rd party
cloud app system: (1) a developer who programs and
manages a 3rd party app, (2) a user who uses that app
for achieving a certain service, and (3) a cloud storage
provider (CSP) hosting the user’s data. Using the CSP’s
API, the app gets access to a subset of the user’s data
after user authorization, which is based on the user ac-
cepting a list of permissions that determines this subset.
2.1 Threat Model
Upon using 3rd party cloud apps that access their data,
users sacrifice some of their privacy for getting some ser-
vice(s). This tradeo  between privacy and services has
been called the Privacy vs. Services Dilemma in the lit-
erature [5]. However, as we will see in the next section,
there are many apps that require more permissions than
are needed for them to function. We call such apps over-
privileged apps (as opposed to least-privileged apps that
only request the permissions needed for their function-
ality). These apps pose a risk which can be potentially
exploited, e.g., by selling data to 3rd party advertising
providers. A lot of the highly used 3rd party apps do not
have privacy policies or justifications of the requested
permissions. Moreover, the users are not usually aware
of the API details or the app functionality, especially be-
fore installing the apps. Thus, the choice of installation
is not well-informed from a privacy perspective. In this
work, we consider the 3rd party apps as the adversary
(and not the CSP). We seek to combat the risk posed
by over-privileged apps through improving the risk indi-
cators (permission models in particular) that users are
presented with, during the authorization process.
2.2 The Case of Google Drive
Towards that end, we have taken Google Drive as a
case study, and we have anatomized this ecosystem in
detail. Nevertheless, the insights gained from our anal-
ysis are applicable to other cloud platforms as well. To
begin with, any developer can register an app that ac-
cesses Google Drive API at Google Developers Console
for free. She then receives a Client ID and Client Se-
cret that need to be included in the app code to access
Google APIs. The developer can then specify in her code
a set of Google permissions (a.k.a. scopes) she wants to
obtain. The app itself can be hosted on any website the
AllowDeny
Pdf Merger would like to:
View and manage Google Drive files and folders that
you have opened or created with this app
View and manage the files in your Google Drive
By clicking Allow, you allow this app and Google to use your information in
accordance with their respective terms of service and privacy policies. You can
change this and other Account Permissions at any time.
Fig. 1. Example of the current permissions interface of
Google Drive
developer chooses; i.e., it is not hosted by Google itself.
The developer can also submit a request for featuring
the app on Google Chrome Web Store, which has a sec-
tion for apps that work with Google Drive. In the store,
apps are presented along with screenshots and descrip-
tions of their functionality (provided by the developer).
The store also allows users to rate and review apps.
Apps can be also submitted to other web stores hosted
by Google, such as the Add-ons Stores for Google Docs,
Google Sheets, or Google Slides and the Google Apps
Marketplace for enterprises. However, there are a lot of
apps that exist outside these stores.
An app can request permission to access Google
Drive data at any time of its operation, and not nec-
essarily at the beginning. For example, the user can be
presented with a button in a side menu that reads “Im-
port file from Google Drive”, and clicking on this button
redirects to a Google-hosted page that presents the set
of permissions requested by the app, as shown in Fig-
ure 1. The user has to accept all these permissions to
connect the app to her Google Drive. She cannot select
a subset of them at installation time or later. However,
she may revoke the app authorization completely from
her Google account settings. As we see later, the absence
of a standard location and interface for hosting apps and
triggering the permissions request is one of the reasons
that makes the automated, large-scale privacy analy-
sis of apps infeasible. The main permissions pertinent
to Google Drive are presented in Table 1, along with
the Google-provided description for each. This short de-
scription is also presented to the user, and a longer ex-
planation is available via clicking the info button i next
to each permission.
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Permission Short Name
View and manage the files in your
Google Drive. drive
View the files in your Google Drive. drive_readonly
View and manage metadata of files
in your Google Drive. drive_metadata
View metadata for files in your
Google Drive. drive_metadata_readonly
View and manage Google Drive files
that you have opened or created
with this app.
drive_file
View your Google Drive apps. drive_apps_readonly
Add itself to Google Drive. add_drive
View and manage its own configura-
tion data in your Google Drive. drive_appdata
Table 1. Requested permissions with the short name we use
for reference
As far as files’ data is concerned, an app can request
access to all files (drive and drive_readonly permis-
sions) or on a per-file basis (drive_file). When devel-
opers request drive_file only, the explicit approval
for each new file(s) is mediated by an interface pro-
vided by Google. For example, the developer presents
the user with a Google-hosted file picker popup (Fig-
ure 2) so that she can select (and thus approve ac-
cess to) the file. Alternatively, the file can be opened
from Google Drive’s interface via the “Open with” op-
tion in the context menu of the file. In the case of
full access, an app can access any file directly via
Google Drive API without the need for user interven-
tion. For example, this type of access enables an app
to obtain all the user’s files and download them in
the background. The developer can alternatively re-
quest access to file metadata only via drive_metadata
or drive_metadata_readonly (allows accessing file-
names, editing dates, photos’ Exif information, etc.).
Additionally, the developer can request access to
the list of apps the user has authorized before via
drive_apps_readonly. It is worth noting that the
permission list is not limited to Google Drive API and
that it typically includes permissions from other Google
APIs, such as access to user’s profile information, email
address, contacts list, etc.
3 Privacy Risk of 3rd Party
Google Drive Apps
The question that comes next is: “what is the ex-
tent of risk that actual users are exposed to?”
To answer this, we examined a sample of 3rd party
Google Drive apps to determine the percentage of apps
that request extra permissions. We proceeded to Google
Chrome Web Store, which has a section for apps that
 
Hide welcome message
Welcome to My Tasks!
This is My Tasks, and every task that’s assigned to you will be co
This can be your personal to-do list.
Completed Tasks
My Private Tasks
test  
̂
 
New Task
 
ashboard
y Tasks 1
alendar
ivate Tasks 1
nassigned
how more
CTS
 
eate your first project
Select a le
 
foret.jpg me Jun 8, 2015
test.jpg me Jun 8, 2015
paper.pdf me Jun 8, 2015
Select Cancel
Google Drive My Drive Documents Spreadsheets More  
Name Owner Last modi ed
Fig. 2. Google Drive file picker interface
work with Google Drive. The store features apps on
its main page, that change with time. In total, there
are around 420 apps on the store that are labeled as
“Works with Google Drive”. We selected 100 featured
apps at random from the main page (during May 2015),
and we manually reviewed them one by one. Hence, our
sample represents around one-fourth of the whole set of
apps in the store, which is one of the main avenues for
finding Google Drive apps. As we discuss later in Sec-
tion 7.1, we discovered that, in our real word sample
of 1440 users, around one-fourth of the installed apps
are from the Google Chrome Store. More details on the
apps’ dataset are presented in Appendix A.
3.1 Permissions Review Process
We now explain the App Permissions Review (APR)
methodology we followed, and we refer the reader to Fig-
ure 15 in Appendix A for the corresponding flowchart.
Our methodology is inspired by Google Drive’s guide for
choosing authentication scopes. Each APR aims to get:
(a) set P of requested permissions, (b) set S of suf-
ficient permissions for the app functionality. We start
each APR by going to the app’s website, linked from the
store, and testing the app manually. For each app, we
first find the step where the app can be connected to
Google Drive (if this is not upon the initial sign up).
Then, we record the set P of requested permissions and
authorize the app to access a test Google Drive account
created for this purpose, and we record the permissions
requested. If drive_file (i.e. minimal per-file access)
is the only Google Drive permission requested, the app
review is complete (S = {drive_file}). Otherwise, we
continue to check the app’s interface for all file pickers
that allow importing files from Google Drive (in almost
all the cases, there is at most one file picker).
In the first case where the app solely uses Google’s
o cial file picker of Figure 2 (e.g., an app that allows
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Permission Unneeded Needed
drive_readonly 17 1
drive 55 7
drive_metadata_ readonly 2 1
drive_file 0 41
Table 2. Permissions’ Usage in APRs
users to convert specific files to PDF format), we set
S = {drive_file}. In the second case where we find
that there are no file pickers in the interface and that
the app functionality does not require access to any file,
the app is labeled as not requiring any file permissions
(S = {}). In the case where the app includes a custom
file picker, we decide that (a) S = {drive} if the app’s
declared functionality necessitates files’ content (e.g.,
a photo collage app with custom photos browser) or
(b) S = {drive_metadata} if the functionality does
not need the content (e.g., an app that visualizes who
has access to a selected folder). Similarly, if the app
has no file picker, we decide that (a) S = {drive} if
the app’s declared functionality necessitates file content
(e.g., malware scanning apps for Google Drive that do
not need a file picker) or (b) S = {drive_metadata}
if the functionality necessitates file metadata (e.g., an
app that visualizes all collaborators with access to user’s
files). Finally, we label an app as over-privileged if
either (a) the set S is empty and P is not or (b) if the
set P contains at least one permission that is more de-
manding than all permissions in S (the five file-related
permissions in Table 1 are listed from the most demand-
ing down to the least demanding). We also determine
the set of unneeded permissions U , composed of each
permission in P that is more demanding than all per-
missions in S. The set of needed permissions is given
by N = P \ U .
3.2 Review Results
Analyzing the APRs, we found out that 64 out of 100
apps request unneeded permissions. In other words, the
developers could have requested less invasive permis-
sions with the current API provided by Google. In to-
tal, 76 out of the 100 apps requested full access to the
all the files in the user’s Google Drive. Moreover, the 64
over-privileged apps have actually all requested full ac-
cess. Accordingly, in our sample, around 84% (64/76)
of apps requesting full access are over-privileged.
The top permission that is needlessly requested is
the full read and write access to Google Drive (in 55
apps), followed by the full read access permission (in
17 apps). This further increases the magnitude of data
that can be exploited with the extra permissions. On
the other hand, the per-file access permission is the top
permission that is actually needed when requested. This
happens in 41 of the apps. However, in 16 of these 41
apps, we have found that the developer also requested
full access to the user’s data. Accordingly, developers are
sometimes mixing full-access with partial access (which
is a subset of the former). We note that such mixing
of permissions can either be the result of developer in-
competence, or it may be aimed at deceiving the user.
Regardless, such apps pose a risk which can be poten-
tially exploited. Another outcome of the APR was that
drive_file was the top alternative permission (in 48
apps) that could replace the unnecessary permissions
requested. drive_metadata_readonly was the alter-
native for one app only. This indicates that, simply, the
correct usage of the current Google Drive API (which
does provide per-file access), can eliminate the major
part of the privacy risk. Nevertheless, it is evident that
developers are generally guilty of not doing this.
3.3 Automating the APR Process
Being an external party, we do not have access to the full
list of Google Drive apps with their permissions. Hence,
the first task we had to do was to find the position in
each app where Google Drive permissions are requested.
This is not always on the main page of the app, and
sometimes finding it requires navigating multiple menus
and/or pages. Automating this task involves building an
advanced web crawler that can retrieve the permissions
from a large number of such apps by smartly searching
for the sign-in button. The second task was checking the
functionality of the app in order to see if it matches the
requested permissions. Automating the process of over-
privilege detection or of real time private data leakage
detection has been tackled in the mobile apps scenario
(e.g. in [10] and [9]). However, in the mobile scenario
(or any similar architecture), the user’s device hosts the
data, the 3rd party apps, and the detection/monitoring
solution. Cloud apps present a radically di erent sce-
nario as the data is hosted by the CSP, the 3rd party
app is served at a developer-specified location, and any
detection/monitoring app would operate from outside.
The only part of the code that the 3rd party app ex-
poses is the client side code. Hence, all techniques that
check the app’s code (e.g., via static/dynamic analy-
sis) or its inputs/outputs cannot be transplanted to the
cloud app case as they would evidently underestimate
what APIs/permissions the app might need. The only
automatic way we perceive for over-privilege detection
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is to cluster apps of similar functionality and identify
the ones which request more permissions than others in
the same cluster. Even then, the data collected man-
ually would be used as the ground-truth to evaluate
the automated method. Detecting actual data leakage
is much more challenging in the cloud apps scenario as
the app can send users’ data to other parties from the
server side (which is impossible to monitor via exter-
nal solutions). Faced with these limitations, manual ex-
pert reviews are the closest we can get to assessing the
apps’ needed permissions. Still, we do not claim that
this method is perfectly accurate as a developer might
be working on a non-advertised feature that requires
new permissions. However, we conjecture that APRs are
accurate with the vast majority of the reviewed apps1.
Finally, as our main purpose in this work is to charac-
terize the ecosystem and suggest alternative permission
models, automating both the app permissions collection
and the over-privilege detection tasks falls out of the
scope of this work. We note though that we are con-
currently working on the specific research problem of
designing automated APRs.
4 New Permission Models
In the light of the risk that over-privileged apps pose,
we propose in this section three alternatives to the exist-
ing permission model in Google Drive before evaluating
their e cacy in mitigating the risk in the next section.
4.1 Delta Permissions
Our first model is based on the following hypothesis:
“When users are informed about the unneeded permis-
sions being requested by apps, they are less likely to au-
thorize such apps.” Hence, this model replaces the cur-
rent permissions interface displayed in Figure 1 with a
new interface, presented in Figure 3. We call this per-
mission model Delta Permissions (DP), and it reveals
to the user the distinction between permissions that are
needed for the app functionality and those others (the
delta) that are unnecessarily requested.
1 From our experience over one year, rarely did apps introduce
new features that required new permissions. Moreover, in Sec-
tion 6, we discuss how to further alleviate this concern in a
real-world deployment by allowing developers to submit rebut-
tals.
View	and	manage	 the	files	 in	your	Google	 Drive.
View	and	manage	Google	 Drive	files	 that	you	
have	opened	 or	created	with	this	app.
obtain	permissions	it	doesn’t	need
obtain	permissions	it	needs	to	function
Pdf	Merger	would	like	to:
Fig. 3. Example of Delta Permissions interface
4.2 Immediate Insights
The second model is based on the following hypothesis:
“When users are shown samples of the data that can
be extracted from the unneeded permissions granted to
apps, they are less likely to authorize these apps.” Ac-
cordingly, we show users randomly selected data exam-
ples, directly extracted from their Google Drive, such as
excerpts of text or image files, photo locations, or people
she collaborated with. An instance of this model, which
we call Immediate Insights (IM), is given in Figure 4.
On the left, we have the same previous DP interface.
On the right, we have the Insights Area, where we show
a question that says: “What do the unneeded per-
missions say about you?”, followed by an answer in
the form of a visual with short explanatory text. In this
figure, the Insights Area visualizes the location where a
randomly chosen user photo was taken. In the following,
we describe the design of the IM Insights:
Image:We show an image selected at random from the
set of user’s image files.
Location:We randomly choose a photo from the set of
user’s image files, such that it includes a GPS location
in its Exif data. Then we show that photo on a map
centered at that location (as in Figure 4).
Text: We show the user an excerpt from the beginning
of a randomly chosen textual file.
Collaborator: We show the profile picture and the
name of a randomly chosen collaborator.
4.3 Far-reaching Insights
The third model is based on the following hypothesis:
“When the users are shown the far-reaching informa-
tion that can be inferred from the unneeded permissions
granted to apps, they are less likely to authorize these
apps.” These are insights that go beyond examples and
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Insights	Area
They	tell	the	app	that	you	have	an	image,	named	‘dinner.jpg’,	
which	was	captured	at	this	location:View	and	manage	the	files	 in	your	Google	Drive.
View	and	manage	Google	Drive	 files	that	you	
have	opened	or	created	with	this	app.
obtain	permissions	it	doesn’t	need
obtain	permissions	it	needs	to	function
Pdf	Merger	would	like	to:
What	do	the	unneeded	permissions	say	about	you??
Fig. 4. Example of Immediate Insights interface; the same layout is used for Far-reaching
insights, with the insights area content changing accordingly
Texas
They tell the app that these People, Places,
 Companies, etc., are important to you:
i
Oakland
Iraq
Julien 
AssangeWikileaks
Tor DARPA
Edward 
Snowden
Fig. 5. Named Entities in-
sight
NSAObama
You're positive about: You're negative about:
They tell the app that you have the following views:i
DARPA
BarackCoca Cola Wikileaks
Edward
Snowden
Fig. 6. Sentiments insight
They tell the app that, with the above people, 
you share documents on these topics:
i
Technology Access Control
John Smith Huell Babineaux Adam Kerry 
War & Crime
Fig. 7. SharedInterests insight
They tell the app that the above faces appear 
in your photos along with these items
i
Gun
ComputerAlcohol
DishMusical Instrument
Office
Fig. 8. FacesWithContext
insight
Fish Sport Butcher Shop
i They tell the app where your photos were
taken and who what appeared in them.
Fig. 9. FacesOnMap in-
sight
include what can be inferred by running more involved
algorithms, such as sentiments towards entities, objects
identified in photos, faces detected, etc. Hence, we de-
note this model by Far-reaching Insights (or shortly FR
Insights). The interface layout is the same as that of
Figure 4, but with the Insights Area containing an FR
insight instead of an immediate insight. In this work,
we have designed 6 types of FR insights that can be
extracted from users’ data. Below, we briefly describe
each of them and we refer the reader to Appendix B for
the algorithms used for their generation:
Entities, Concepts, and Topics (ECT): The first
type of insights we form is based on applying various
NLP techniques to extract named Entities (E), Concepts
(C), and Topics (T) from users’ textual files. Entities,
extracted via Named Entity Recognition, might include
people the user works with, companies she talks about,
places she plans to visit, etc. Concepts are extracted tags
from the user’s documents. For example, the sentence
“My favorite brands are BMW, Ferrari, and Porsche”,
would be tagged by the concept “Automotive Industry”.
Topics are higher level abstractions (e.g. technology, art,
business, etc.) that can be used for classifying users’
documents. Both concepts and topics can serve for pro-
filing users’ interests. We combine these together due to
the similar nature of these insights. When we use ECT,
one of E, T or C is randomly displayed to the user in
the Insights Area. For purposes of text analysis in this
work, we partially used AlchemyAPI’s service with ran-
dom excerpts of text extracted from users’ documents.
Users in our experiments were informed about this on
the main page of the web app they sign in to.
Sentiments: We used sentiment analysis in order to
identify the entities with the most positive or negative
sentiments and then display them to the user in the
Insights Area as in Figure 6.
Top Collaborators: The next insight we added dis-
plays the top collaborators a user has, based on the
analyzed files. These typically include close work col-
leagues, intimate friends, or people the user goes out
with and shares pictures with afterward.
Shared Interests: In this insight, we represent the
user’s mutual topics of interests with a group of peo-
ple. As shown in Figure 7, the Insights Area would then
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Text	Analysis
Image	Analysis
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Fig. 10. Component diagram mapping the used analysis tech-
niques to the generated insights
contain a list of people alongside di erent topics of doc-
uments shared with these people.
Faces with Context: We now come to the insights
that are based on features inside the user’s images. The
first insight of this type shows a group of faces, repre-
senting the most frequent people appearing in the user’s
images, alongside the concepts that appear in the same
images (see Figure 8). One can imagine that such infor-
mation might be valuable, for example, to advertisers
that aim to extract the user’s interests in certain peo-
ple, products, or services.
Faces on Map: In addition to the image content itself,
image metadata can be also sensitive, especially the geo-
graphical location where the image is captured. Hence,
this insight, shown in Figure 9, relays to the user the
places where her photos are taken, in addition to the
faces and items in those photos.
The component diagram of Figure 10 summarizes the
techniques used for generating each of the FR insights.
Further Notes:We note that the reasoning behind de-
signing lightweight models such as DP and IM was that
we wanted to examine whether designing heavyweight
insights such as FR Insights is worth the e ort for us
and the potential adopters of our approach, or do users
respond equally favorably (or badly) to both the heavy
and the lightweight approaches, in which case FR in-
sights need not be adopted? We also note that, for an
app that does not request unneeded permissions (even
if it requests full access), the Insights Area will sim-
ply show a text saying that the app doesn’t require
any extra permissions. We also note that we follow
Google Drive’s approach of requesting permissions “At
Setup” [22] (i.e., at the first time of app authorization).
This is unlike other ecosystems (e.g., iOS or Android
M), which require a “Just in Time” approach (i.e., per-
missions are requested only when the actual functional-
ity is needed). This is because, in Google Drive, many
apps are supposed to work with the user’s data even
when she is o ine. Hence, granting access in an inter-
active manner for individual permissions is not always
feasible.
5 Evaluating the Models
5.1 Experimental Setup
We designed an experiment with actual users in order to
test the hypothesis of whether the new models can bet-
ter deter the users from installing over-privileged apps
as compared to the existing one, and to discover factors
that influence users’ decisions.
5.1.1 User Recruitment:
In order to recruit users, we primarily used our uni-
versity’s mailing list. The users were briefed about an
app that is related to protecting the privacy of their
data against 3rd party apps on Google Drive. The news
about the app was also reported on the university’s web-
site and was picked up by several technology websites.
The website described itself as an app for Google Drive
that aims at exposing what 3rd party web apps can
needlessly get about users.
Via our website, the users can sign in to their Google
account and then grant full Google Drive access to our
app. Next to the “sign in” button, we linked to our pri-
vacy policy, explaining what data the app gets and what
it keeps. Only those users who had at least 10 files con-
taining text or 20 images were allowed to continue. This
is to ensure that they possess at least a minimal level of
experience with Google Drive. Figure 19 of Appendix C
shows the density plot of the percentages of users’ an-
alyzed files that are textual. Next, users who agreed to
participate in our experiment were randomly assigned
to one of the groups described below. As a motivation
to complete the experiments, the users were enrolled in
a lucky draw, where they could win one of five gift cards
to a mobile app store of their choice.
5.1.2 Methodology:
The first goal of the experiment is to investigate the
e cacy of the three new permission models by com-
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paring them to the existing Google Drive permission
model as well as to each other. The second goal is to
perform micro-comparisons among the di erent types of
IM and FR insights. Accordingly, we went for a mixed
between-subject and within-subject design. The reason
for not going for a complete between-subject design was
the large number of participants needed for statistically
significant results with 12 independent groups (for all
micro-comparisons). The reason for not going for a com-
plete within-subject design was to avoid any partici-
pants’ bias that can result from showing the existing
interface they are used to and the new interface we de-
veloped in the same experiment. Accordingly, we had
four groups in our experiment. A user is assigned to one
single group, and the only permission interface she sees
during the experiment is that of its group. The groups
were:
1. Baseline group (BL group): Users in this group
were presented with a clone of the original interface
that Google shows upon installing the app (shown
in Figure 1). This group serves as the control group,
and we briefly refer to it as BL
2. Delta Permissions group (DP group): Users in
this group were presented with the modified inter-
face, previously shown in Figure 3.
3. Immediate Insights Group (IM group): Users
in this group were presented with the modified in-
terface of Figure 4, with the Insights area containing
one of the IM insights of Section 4.2.
4. Far-reaching Insights Group (FR group):
Users in this group were presented with the modified
interface, of Figure 4, with the Insights Area con-
taining one the FR insights described in Section 4.3.
A user experiment was divided into multiple tasks. In
each task, the user was requested to select an app with
a specified goal. For example, the goal would read “Se-
lect the app which allows you to extract the ZIP files on
your Google Drive”, and the corresponding app would
be “ZIP Extractor”. The user would then choose this
app among other apps that are listed in the interface.
We show this interface in Figure 26 of Appendix C, and
we note that it is similar to the actual Google Chrome
Web Store. Moreover, only one app of those listed satis-
fies the given goal, and it is highlighted in the interface.
This part of the setup only serves a gamification pur-
pose in order to keep the user interested. Once the user
selects the app, she is presented with a permission inter-
face that corresponds to its group (i.e. that of Figure 1
for the BL group, Figure 3 for the DP group, and Fig-
ure 4 with a randomly selected visual for the IM or FR
Insights groups). The user is then presented with a ques-
tion that says: “Based on permissions below, would you
be likely to install this app?”. She can choose between
“Permissions are too invasive” (accept) and “I’m OK
with these permissions” (reject). We worded the ques-
tion so that we avoid all users rejecting the installations
of all apps. We rather aimed that users would reject
apps whose permissions they consider as too invasive,
thus allowing us to do within-subject comparisons. After
answering the question, the user is directed to the next
task with another app, until she completes the whole
set of tasks.
The apps used in the experiment were obtained from
the Google Drive section of the Chrome Web Store. For
experimental purposes, we modified the permissions re-
quested by these apps to be able to test various condi-
tions. Unlike in the store, we removed elements such as
ratings, user reviews, and screenshots and kept a mini-
mal interface, allowing the users to focus solely on the
app permissions. We also avoided using apps from pop-
ular vendors to avoid the bias resulting from users being
influenced by famous brands. These steps were taken to
study the e ect that the permission model has on the
user’s decisions, without the influence of extraneous fac-
tors2. Moreover, the apps were presented to the users in
randomized order to compensate for the e ects of learn-
ing and fatigue. For reference, the permissions that each
app requested are presented in Table 3. A user assigned
to the BL or DP groups had to install 5 apps in 5 tasks.
For the IM Insights and FR groups, we added additional
apps. This is because we wanted to compare the e ects
of the di erent kinds of insights. The permissions of the
additional apps were fixed to those of (ZIP Extractor),
but the insights displayed were changing. For each user,
the insights were assigned at random to each of those
added apps. In total, users assigned to the IM Insights
and FR Insights groups had to complete 8 and 10 tasks
respectively.
5.1.3 Data Protection and Ethics:
Respecting the user privacy when working with cloud
data is of fundamental importance. Our experiments
were done according to a code of ethics protecting this
2 Incidentally, the user might confront a scenario exactly as in
the experiments if she does not find the app from the store, but
lands on a certain site that has the option of authenticating with
Google Drive.
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App drive drive_metadata drive_file
group
ZIP Extractor R,U R,N 1,2,3,4
Xodo pdf
Viewer & Editor R,U R,N 1,2,3,4
WhoHasAccess R,U R,N 1,2,3,4
Video Converter R,U 1,2,3,4
Cloud Convert R,U NR,N 1,2,3,4
HelloFax R,U R,N 3,4
Heap Note R,U R,N 3,4
Photo to
Cartoon R,U R,N 3,4
PDFUnlock R,U R,N 4
HelloSign R,U R,N 4
Table 3. Permissions of apps in the experiment. R: Re-
quested, N : Needed, U : Unneeded, NR: Not Requested
privacy. In particular, after generating the insights from
a user’s files, these files are deleted immediately from our
apps’ servers. As per our displayed privacy policy, only
the insights’ data presented to the user is kept in the
app database. Moreover, the user is given the option to
delete her insights data at any time with a single click
in the app’s menu. The database dump we ran our anal-
ysis on was isolated from the one to which the deployed
web server connects. Also, we use the https protocol so
that users can securely connect to our system. Before
data analysis, we anonymized any occurrence of names
and emails in the database by applying a one-way MD5
hash on them. At all times, we refrained from manu-
ally checking the database for users’ insights. All the
images used in this paper are in the public domain, and
the insights shown do not belong to real users. For fur-
ther transparency, all the libraries and frameworks used
for building the tool and data analysis were listed and
linked to from the main page of the website. Although
an IRB review was not performed beforehand, this pa-
per was subsequently reviewed by our university’s IRB,
which did not object to publishing the results.
5.2 Results
We got 210 users in total who successfully completed
this part of the experiment. Out of them, 55 were in the
BL Group, 50 in the DP Group, 54 in the IM Insights
group, and 51 in the FR group. We start by interpreting
the results of our user experiment and comparing the
e cacy of the various permission models. The metric
we used in our evaluation is the Acceptance Likelihood
AL, defined as:
AL = #(Accepts)#(Accepts)+#(Rejects) , (1)
where Accepts denotes the cases where users were fine
with the permissions, and Rejects denotes the cases
where they found them too invasive. Accepts and Rejects
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Fig. 12. p-values of pairwise tests; if p-valueÆ 0.05 we consider
the visuals on the corresponding row and column as di erent;
the di erence direction is obtained from Figure 11
are aggregated across users and tasks for the permission
model under consideration. The lower the AL, the bet-
ter the performance in deterring users from installing
over-privileged apps.
In order to compare the e ect of di erent interfaces,
we plotted in Figure 11 the Acceptance Likelihood for
the BL and DP groups and also for each particular in-
sight of the IM and FR Insights groups. To evaluate
the significance of the AL di erences among the in-
terface types, we fit a generalized linear mixed model
(GLMM) with the user’s decision (Accepting/Rejecting
the app installation) as the binary response variable and
the interface type as the fixed e ect. Participants’ IDs
and apps’ names were fitted as random e ects to con-
trol for the potential between-participants and between-
apps variabilities. The model was fit assuming a bino-
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mial distribution and a logit link function, using the
glmer function in the lme4 package in R [6]. Visual in-
spection of residual plots did not reveal any obvious
deviations from homoscedasticity or normality. The sig-
nificance of di erences among AL values was determined
using Tukey Honest Significant Di erence test with the
glht function of the multcomp package [15]. The di er-
ence between the AL of any two interfaces in Figure 11
is significant if the corresponding row and column inter-
sect at a p-valueÆ 0.05 in Figure 12.
Ine cacy of Baseline and Delta Permissions: We
first found that the Delta Permissions and Baseline ap-
proaches performed closely (AL of 0.42 and 0.39 re-
spectively) without a statistically significant di erence
(p-values= 0.77). Hence, we found no evidence of any
advantage that the DP can introduce, which means that
telling our experiment’s participants explicitly about
unneeded permissions did not help deter them from
installing over-privileged apps. We also observe that
both these interfaces had a significantly higher AL (i.e.
p-valuesÆ 0.05) than all the insights, except for the Col-
laborator insight. This highlights the fact that showing
well-selected insights will result in deterring more users
compared to the case of not showing any insights.
The Power of Relational Insights: The next in-
teresting outcome is that there is a category of in-
sights (Category 1) composed of {Image, Text, ECT,
and Sentiments} that are all associated with a signif-
icantly higher acceptance likelihood than the category
composed of {FacesWithContext, TopCollaborators, and
SharedInterests} (Category 2)3. Since this is a very in-
teresting result, we investigate further to analyze the
defining characteristics of these two naturally clustered
categories. The main feature of Category 1, which in-
cludes both IM and FR insights, is that insights in this
category are restricted to characterizing the user her-
self, such as showing text excerpts from her documents,
topics appearing in them, or images she has in her files.
Hence, we denote this category as Personal Insights.
On the other hand, the defining feature of Category 2
insights, which are all Far-reaching, is that they extend
to characterizing the relationships of the user with other
people. For instance, FacesWithContext shows the most
important faces in user’s photos along with the items
appearing with them. SharedInterests shows the people
who collaborate with the user and the type of topics
3 The number of users who had location-tagged photos was low;
hence, we could not obtain highly significant results in the case
of Location and FacesOnMap insights.
they share. Also, TopCollaborators identifies the most
frequent people the user interacts with. We denote these
as Relational Insights. From our results, we can conclude
that Relational Insights promote greater privacy aware-
ness in users, as such insights are more likely to dissuade
them from installing over-privileged apps.
Impact of Face Recognition: Delving deeper into
more results brought forth by the comparison of di er-
ent insights, one can notice that showing examples of
user’s images (AL = 0.21) is significantly less deterring
than showing the important faces and listing the con-
cepts in the image (AL = 0.08) with pairwise compar-
ison p-value< 0.01. This highlights the fact that users
are sensitive towards the output of face detection and
object recognition in photos. Given that services such as
Google Photos, OneDrive, and Flickr already apply such
techniques to facilitate search, the above result high-
lights that they can also be used by these companies to
easily implement solutions such as ours for raising users’
privacy awareness when sharing data.
Influence of High-Level Textual Insights: Con-
trary to the case of images, in the case of textual doc-
uments, showing the high-level entities or concepts ex-
tracted from the text does not seem to have a signifi-
cant di erence as compared to simply showing direct ex-
cerpts from the text (p-value= 0.94). Only when the re-
lationship factor is introduced does the AL significantly
decrease (as in the case of SharedInterests).
Superiority of Far-reaching Insights: By aggregat-
ing the results over all the experiments with FR In-
sights, we obtained a lower AL value compared to IM
Insights (AL = 0.161 and 0.226 respectively). To check
the statistical significance of this di erence, we followed
the previous methodology and fit a GLMM model, but
with the fixed e ect being the experimental group in-
stead of the specific interface. We confirmed that the
AL di erence is significant with a pairwise compari-
son p-value= 0.004). We also noticed from Figure 12
that the best Far-reaching insight, FacesWithContext
(AL = 0.081), performed more than twice better than
the best Immediate Insight, Text insight (AL = 0.206)
(ignoring the insights where the di erence is not statisti-
cally significant). Overall, these results demonstrate the
superiority of our novel approach of FR Insights. Nev-
ertheless, IM Insights are still significantly better than
the BL and DP models. This goes in line with the find-
ings of [13], which showed the goodness of an approach
similar to Immediate Insights in the case of Android
permissions, even though they didn’t have Delta Per-
missions as a building block.
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5.3 Limitations
First, our design of the experiment abstracted sev-
eral other factors that users take into account when
installing apps. The interplay between ratings, app’s
brand, and permissions has been studied before ([18]
and [13]), and it might be worth revisiting in a future
work in the context of our new permission models. Sec-
ond, our experiment’s advertisement included a mention
of privacy as we wanted participants to focus on the app
permissions. Evidently, this might have made partici-
pants more alert towards this issue. Both these points
can imply that the real values of the AL might be dif-
ferent in reality, where privacy might not be the main
factor. Nevertheless, even if the absolute values of AL
have been impacted, the relative advantages of new per-
mission models still hold. Moreover, we also note that
the users in the FR and IM groups had to do more
tasks than the BL and DP groups, which might have
resulted in more user fatigue and habituation in the FR
and IM groups. This was counteracted first via task
randomization at design time and second by the very
nature of insights that change at every step. For further
validation, we computed the AL values of Figure 11,
considering only the first 5 tasks each user performed.
We did not see any major deviation from the results
with all tasks included. Finally, our user recruitment
strategy was primarily targeted towards our university’s
network, and our study was only for English speakers. It
would be interesting to see how the results compare in
a more general sample (linguistically, demographically
and geographically).
6 PrivySeal: A Privacy-Focused
App Store
Driven by the magnitude of the risk posed by over-
privileged apps in Google Drive, we were motivated to
bring the advantages of the Far-reaching Insights in-
terface to the user community of this platform. One
approach towards achieving that would be for Google
itself to implement a scheme similar to ours and to in-
tegrate it within the app authorization process. How-
ever, we decided not to wait and chose an alter-
native approach, which is independent of the com-
pany’s plans and is ready for user utilization imme-
diately. We built PrivySeal, a privacy-focused store
for Google Drive apps, which is readily available at
https://privyseal.epfl.ch. PrivySeal allows users to
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Fig. 13. Component diagram of PrivySeal (components la-
beled by S are server-side and by C are client-side)
navigate a list of apps, click on those of interest, and
check whether they are over-privileged via our FR In-
sights interface. Users can also search by keyword for
apps, specifying criteria such as the app being least-
privileged. The component diagram for PrivySeal is
shown in Figure 13. Similar to the APRs we conducted,
we have included a “Review Wizard” inside PrivySeal
for indicating the requested, needed and unneeded per-
missions along with the alternative permissions the de-
veloper could have used. This responsibility is currently
given to a small set of expert developers and is moder-
ated by the store administrators. Developers who would
like to object to existing APRs of their apps can submit
rebuttals. Currently, PrivySeal has 100 apps and more
than 1440 registered users, with a geometric mean of
around 50 new users per month (whose vast majority is
signing up out of interest in the app after reading ar-
ticle(s) about it). We finally note that PrivySeal gets
access, as is the case with other apps, to users’ data to
generate insights. Hence, users are assumed to trust the
provider of such a “Privacy-as-a-Service” solution. How-
ever, this assumption of trust will hold if a solution such
as PrivySeal is hosted by the CSP itself (which already
possesses the data), or an enterprise protecting its doc-
uments from 3rd party apps. The assumption of trust
is also valid if the users choose to trust a single entity
(such as PrivySeal) to protect themselves from mul-
tiple other unaccountable over-privileged entities that
they would otherwise be forced to trust.
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7 Anatomizing Developers’
Behavior
After studying the users’ privacy decisions, we now move
to investigate the developers’ landscape, building on the
apps data that our store’s users have installed. In total,
we obtained data from 1440 registered users of our pri-
vacy store.
7.1 Current Developer Behavior
The “drive_apps_readonly” permission requested
by our app allowed us to get the list of apps previ-
ously installed by users, along with the information that
Google Drive API gives about the apps4. We found 662
unique apps installed by users in our dataset. For each
app, we obtained the following:
i. Access Level: which indicates whether the app
had Partial Access or Full Access to the user’s drive on
authorization time. Since an app can change the per-
missions it requests from future users, our dataset had
instances of the same app installed with di erent access
levels by di erent users. We denote such apps as having
an access level of Both.
ii. App Location: which indicates whether the app is
(1) on Google Chrome Web Store, (2) on Google’s Other
Web Stores (namely the Add-ons Stores and the Google
Apps Marketplace for enterprises), or (3) Outside Web
Stores of Google. This categorization is inferred by fol-
lowing the productUrl field present in the app informa-
tion, which either leads to one of the stores or is absent.
Figure 14 shows how the apps in our dataset were
distributed over the di erent locations and the number
of apps requesting the di erent access levels. From this
figure, one can observe the following:
4 For details, we refer the reader to: https://developers.google.
com/drive/v2/reference/apps
Developers Changing Behavior: The first surprising
outcome from this dataset is that around 40% of apps on
Chrome Web Store (63 apps) had Both as access level,
signifying that a lot of developers have changed the re-
quested permissions at least once. In order to check the
current access levels of these apps, we reviewed them
one-by-one. We discovered that 59 of these apps (i.e.,
94%) have changed from requesting Partial Access in
the past, to requesting Full Access currently. Hence,
we can deduce that when developers change the access
level, there is a high probability that it is associated with
getting more data instead of the other way round. High-
lighting this change of access level on installation time
can further serve for more informed user decisions.
Developer Deterrence through O cial Stores:
Apps outside the Web Stores requested Full Access al-
most twice as much as they requested Partial Access
(281 full vs. 155 partial). This was not the case in the
Chrome Web Store, where we observe only a slightly
higher number of apps with Full Access (81 full vs. 76
partial - counting apps that fall under the Both ac-
cess level but which currently request Full Access). So
we can see that developers with apps outside the Web
Stores are more prone to asking for Full Access. This can
be explained by the conjecture that the store acts as a
medium where the apps receive more exposure. Hence,
developers there are likely to be under the pressure of
being evaluated through reviews and ratings, and thus
tend to avoid abusing the permissions, while develop-
ers outside Web Stores are under no such pressure. Al-
though Full Access does not necessarily mean that apps
are over-privileged, our APRs have actually shown that
84% of apps that request Full Access are over-privileged
apps. In the case of the Other Web Stores, the number
of apps that requested Partial Access is around thrice
the number that requested Full Access (16 full vs. 47
partial). This is mainly due to the fact that these Add-
ons apps are generally expected to provide functionality
for Google Docs (or other native Google file types), so
deviating from this and requesting permissions for all
Google Drive files will be easily detected by the com-
munity. Similarly, the community of enterprises, which
is highly sensitive towards privacy will deter developers
from requesting Full Access in the Google Apps Mar-
ketplace.
Deterring Developers in the Wild: The majority
of apps in our sample do not actually come from any
Google Web Store (24% from Google Chrome Store,
10% from the Other Web Stores, and 66% from outside
the Web Stores). This is also the case for 75% of the
apps requesting full data access. These can be apps on
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other platforms, such as mobile platforms, for example,
where there are other types of application stores. These
apps can also be ones that are not present in any store
but still have Google Drive integration. Hence, we can
infer that improving the Chrome Web Store privacy in-
dicators might not be a su cient solution for deterring
the majority of developers. There is a need for alterna-
tive solutions, focused on Google Drive permissions in
specific, and independent of the various stores.
7.2 Potential Developer Misbehavior
Although it is clear that full access to users’ data can
expose various far-reaching insights about the user, it is
not completely apparent what seemingly benign permis-
sions, such as metadata-only access can reveal about the
user. In the previous section, we have shown that the
TopCollaborators insight, which can be extracted just
from the metadata, has resulted in an Acceptance Like-
lihood of 0.13, which is around three times lower than
what the current Google permission scheme (Baseline)
attains. Hence, users are remarkably deterred by see-
ing what they expose when they give access to their
file metadata. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore the
potential of information leakage through metadata-only
access. In this section, we show that metadata-only ac-
cess on its own can allow developers to gather deeper
insights about the user’s topics and concepts of interest.
This calls for extending the FR Insights with such in-
formation in order to better inform the user about the
potential risk of giving unneeded access to metadata.
Towards that, we analyze and compare insights inferred
from users’ file metadata to what can be inferred from
file contents (the data).
Upon user u signing up to our app, the following
operations are executed as part of the data analysis:
i. For each analyzed file, the filename is processed by
removing its extension and replacing punctuation marks
by spaces.
iii. The names of all the analyzed files are grouped
into a comma-separated list LFN (u)
iii. Topic and concept analysis are applied to
LFN (u). The service used for text analysis allowed us to
extract topics in the form “a1/a2/ . . . /an”, representing
a hierarchy among the labels (e.g., “/law, government
and politics/espionage and intelligence/surveillance” or
“/finance/investing/venture capital”). In this section,
we di erentiate between General Topics where we only
consider a1, and Specific Topics, where we consider an.
Accordingly, General Topics would indicate user’s in-
terest in law, government and politics or finance for ex-
ample while Specific Topics could indicate the user’s
interest in surveillance or venture capital. At the end of
this step, we filter the results to restrict our analysis of
metadata to a maximum of 3 General Topics, 3 Specific
Topics, and 5 Concepts for each user’s list LFN (u).
iv. From the user’s files’ contents, we extract the
top 5 General Topics, top 10 Specific Topics, and top
20 Concepts. These choices are motivated by the general
observation that one’s Concepts of interest are usually
more in number than the Specific abstract topics one
cares about, which are in turn more than the General
Topics of interest.
For each user u, we compared the list D(u) of la-
bels (i.e., concepts/topics) extracted from the files’ con-
tents with the list M(u) of labels extracted from the list
LFN (u) of filenames. We selected precision as the evalu-
ation metric as we are mainly interested in determining
whether labels extracted from metadata serve as a good
approximation of labels extracted from the data. In-
spired by the multi-label classification literature [23], we
computed precision using the micro-averaging method,
i.e., directly across all labels. A label occurrence is con-
sidered as true positive if it belongs to M(u)ﬂD(u) and
a false positive if it belongs to M(u) \D(u). tp(l) is the
number of true positives for a label l, and fp(l) is that
of false positives, both across all users. Let LT also be
the set of all labels found across user’s data and meta-
data. The overall precision is thus given by the following
equation:
Pmicro =
qN
lœLT tp(l)qN
lœLT (tp(l) + fp(l))
(2)
We used this method instead of macro-averaging (i.e.,
computing the precision per label and then taking the
average) because we are interested in estimating the
users’ interests more than the ability to predict each
and every label. For this experiment, we only consid-
ered who signed in to our app and had at least 10 textual
files with associated concepts/topics. Hence, our sample
contained 200 users. Interestingly, the results for Gen-
eral Topics indicate that 0.78 of the metadata labels
across users match with their top 5 topics of interest. In
the case of Specific Topics, on average, nearly two of the
three extracted metadata labels also appear in the top
10 Specific Topics extracted from data (Pmicro = 0.61).
Finally, the fraction of metadata Concepts that also ap-
pear in the data is around one-third (Pmicro = 0.31).
However, this does not necessarily imply that the other
two-thirds of concepts appearing in the metadata are
not relevant to the user. In fact, we have noticed that a
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lot of these metadata labels are semantically similar to
those in the data.
In sum, we have observed that metadata on its own
can be considerably accurate in revealing part of users’
interests. It can be easily abused by sophisticated ad-
versaries who conceal their misbehavior through only
requesting seemingly benign permissions (for metadata
access). Therefore, this calls for extending the FR in-
sights in the case of metadata-only access to match
the developer’s potential. For instance, SharedInterests,
which was shown earlier to convey inferences from con-
tent, can also be used as an insight based on the col-
laborators and on the potential mutual topics inferred
exclusively from the files’ metadata.
8 Recommended Best Practices
In addition to PrivySeal, there are several steps that
can serve to mitigate the potential of misbehavior in
Google Drive and similar services. These solutions serve
to help the user both before and after installing the
apps.
Fine-Grained APIs: The availability of finer grained
permissions (such as access for a specific file type) evi-
dently reduces the amount of data in the hands of the
developer and is in line with the principle of least priv-
ilege. One disadvantage of such detailed permissions is
that they become more di cult for users to comprehend
in a short amount of time. However, providing develop-
ers with the means to request such fine-grained controls
should not necessarily result in a more complicated in-
terface. This can be achieved via multi-layered inter-
faces [22]. For example, instead of the app indicating
that it needs to “View the files on your Google Drive”,
it can indicate that it needs to “View files of specific
types in your Google Drive”. Users that are interested
in knowing these file types can then click on an addi-
tional button (such as the info button i in the current
interface of Figure 1).
Transparency Dashboard: A post-installation tech-
nique which can potentially deter developers from actu-
ally abusing the users’ data is for the cloud platform to
provide what we call “Transparency Dashboards”. These
dashboards allow the user to see which files have been
downloaded by each 3rd party app and when such op-
erations took place. Such a monitoring solution for all
apps can only be achieved by the platform itself.
Insights Based on Used Data: Unlike external solu-
tions (e.g., ours) that can only determine what data can
be potentially accessed, the cloud platform can provide
users with insights based on the data that developers
have previously downloaded. Such an interface will help
users better pinpoint adversarial apps that needlessly
retrieve files outside the scope of their functionality.
A Privacy Preserving API Layer: It is not un-
common nowadays to find APIs that work as an ad-
ditional layer on top of one or more existing cloud APIs
(e.g., Cloud Elements Documents Hub). Hence, one so-
lution to build a privacy-preserving API is to create it
as a layer on top of one or multiple existing platforms’
APIs. This new API can provide finer grained access
control, allow permissions reviews from the community,
and implement transparency dashboards. By building
this layer on top of existing cloud APIs that already of-
fer various services, one can circumvent the problem of
attracting developers who might otherwise be loathe to
using a solution that only serves to protect privacy.
9 Related Work
To our knowledge, this is the first work that studies the
problem of user privacy in the context of 3rd party apps
on top of cloud storage providers. Other works have pre-
viously studied the problem of direct information shar-
ing to providers themselves (e.g., [14]).
9.1 Privacy in Other App Ecosystems
In the case of other ecosystems, there are related works
that have studied the current state of privacy notices
(e.g. [7, 11, 16, 21]). For instance, Chia et al., con-
ducted a large-scale analysis of Facebook apps, Chrome
extensions, and Android apps to study the e ectiveness
of user-consent permissions systems [7]. They observed
that the community ratings are not reliable indicators of
app privacy in these ecosystems and showed evidence of
attempts at misleading users into granting permissions
via free apps or apps with mature content. Huber et
al., developed AppInspect, a framework for automating
the detection of malpractices in 3rd party apps within
Facebook’s ecosystem and used network tra c analysis
to spot web trackers and identify leaks of sensitive in-
formation to other third parties [16]. The case of 3rd
party apps in Google Drive di ers from these platforms
in that it is not possible to perform large-scale analysis,
firstly due to the absence of a standard application for-
mat and secondly due to the di culty of automatically
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finding the triggering button for permission requests in
di erent apps. Aside from the above, client-side tra c
analysis is not su cient to detect all cloud data leaks as
the apps can send data to third parties after it arrives
at the server side, to which outsiders do not have access.
9.2 Improving Current Privacy Notices
A few works have recently suggested improvements to
the existing permissions schemes, with a special focus
on the case of Google Play Store. Kelly et al., argued
that the privacy information should be a part of the
app decision-making process and should not be left till
after the user makes her decision [18]. Hence, they ap-
pended a list of “Privacy Facts” to the app description
screen, textually indicating that the app, for example,
collects contacts, location, photos, credit card details,
etc., and found that it assisted users in choosing apps
that request fewer permissions. Harbach et al., proposed
to integrate examples from user’s data in the permis-
sions request screen to expose the data apps can get
access to [13]. This involved showing random pictures,
call logs, location, and contacts from user’s data that
correspond to each permission. Another related work in
the context of Facebook is that by Wang et al. [24],
who introduced the “Privacy Nudges” technique to aid
users while posting statuses to Facebook through show-
ing random profile pictures of friends who can see the
post, introducing a time interval before the actual post
is sent, or showing the post sentiment. In this work,
we go further, and we show that well-crafted visuals
showing far-reaching insights extracted from users’ data
can be more e ective than randomly selected data. We
also show through pairwise comparisons among the in-
sights themselves that the choice of the displayed in-
sight highly a ects the interface’s e ectiveness. It is also
worth mentioning that, in our experiments the number
of users who were involved with their personal accounts
in the experiment was more than five times the number
of users in [13] and [18]. Furthermore, we also provide a
readily available solution for the public in the form of a
privacy-focused app store.
Moreover, our work is in line with the best practices
recommended by the recent work of Schaub et al., who
developed a design space for privacy notices to assist re-
searchers in increasing the impact of their schemes [22].
For instance, we implemented the multi-layered notice
concept by showing data of textual and visual modali-
ties. We also developed various visuals to ensure that the
permissions dialog is polymorphic, which was also shown
recently to have an e ect on reducing the habituation
e ect in the user’s brain [3]. Personalizing warning no-
tices, as we do in this paper, has been studied before
in the context of LED signs [25] and was shown to sig-
nificantly increase compliance compared to impersonal
signs.
10 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we characterized the various factors that
have an impact on user privacy in the ecosystem of 3rd
party apps for the cloud. We considered Google Drive as
an example case study and comprehensively anatomized
the ecosystem from the viewpoint of users, developers,
and the cloud provider. For users, we carefully devised
a set of experiments and tested existing and novel risk
communication models to analyze the factors that in-
fluence users’ decisions in app installation. Our results
provide interesting insights into how user privacy can be
improved and how CSPs can develop better risk indica-
tors. We also presented a privacy aware store for cloud
apps, which already has over 1440 registered users. From
our store users and people who took part in our exper-
iments, we had the unique and unprecedented oppor-
tunity to first-hand study real users cloud data. Based
on this data, we were able to characterize the current
behavior of 3rd party app developers and also point out
avenues for developer misbehavior. Finally, based on our
analysis, we provided several suggestions for CSPs that
can help in safeguarding users’ privacy and protecting
their data from needless leakage and exploitation. In
the future, we aim to build on PrivySeal and develop
a recommendation system that suggests apps of simi-
lar functionality but superior privacy. We are also in
the process of integrating Personalized Insights in the
scenario of user-to-user sharing privacy in StackSync,
which is an open source cloud platform with a signif-
icant number of users. Finally, it would be interesting
to study how our findings on the best risk indicators
generalize to other ecosystems, such as Android or iOS.
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A Review Process and Data
Figure 15 shows the flowchart of the APR process de-
scribed in Section 3.1. Figure 16 shows the distribution
of the installation counts of apps in our dataset on a
log scale, where it is clear that the apps follow closely
a normal distribution (this has been individually con-
firmed using q-q plots). The average number of installa-
tions was 194,600 and the median was 29,350. Figure 17
shows that the number of ratings follows a similar dis-
tribution, with a mean of 736 and a median of 181. The
ratings value distribution is shown in Figure 18, with a
mean of 3.66 and a median of 3.72. Overall, this shows
the diversity of the apps in our APRs dataset and that
represents a wide range of apps.
Reviewer	goes	to	app	URL	
Reviewer	records	permissions	
and	signs	in
Reviewer	finds	the	link	to	
connect	 to	Google	Drive
Reviewer	checks	all	file	pickers	in	
the	interface
DRIVE_FILE	
access	
sufficient
No
Full	access	
needed
Metadata	access	
sufficient
All	pickers	are
Google-provided?
Functionality	requires	
file	content?
Are	there	file	pickers?
YES
NO	(App	has
a	native	file	
picker)
Yes
Functionality	
requires	files’	content/
metadata)?
NO
No	Access	
Needed
YES
YES
NO
YES
App	only	 requires	
DRIVE_FILE	access DRIVE_FILE	
access	
sufficientNO YES
Fig. 15. Flowchart of the APR process, inspired by Google
Drive guide for choosing authentication scopes
(https://developers.google.com/drive/v3/web/about-auth)
B Detailed Insights Description
In this appendix, we detail the di erent Far-reaching
insights that were presented in Section 4.3 and explain
the algorithms used for generating each of them. To-
wards that goal, we highlight two file categories of in-
terest: (1) textual files, such as PDF documents, word-
processing documents, spreadsheets, presentations, text
files, etc., and (2) image files, such as JPEG, PNG,
TIFF, etc. We represent the set of textual files as
TF = TF1, TF2, .., TFK and the set of image files as
IF1, IF2, ..., IFL.
Entities, Concepts, and Topics (ECT):
i. Entities: We get the top named entities (e.g.,
people, places, companies, etc.) present in the user’s
textual files. Such entities are recognized using Named
Entity Recognition (NER), which is a traditional prob-
lem in natural language processing that involves locat-
ing and classifying elements in text into pre-defined cat-
egories [8]. For this task, we perform text extraction on
each file, and we then pass the text to a AlchemyAPI’s
service. Given the text of file TFj , this service returns
a set of entities, along with the frequency of occurrence
fi,j of each entity ei in TFj . We normalize this frequency
for each entity by dividing it by fmaxj , which is the fre-
quency of the most recurrent entity in TFj :
fnormi,j =
fi,j
fmaxj
(3)
Then, we compute an overall score for entity ei across
all the files in TF , by summing its individual normalized
frequencies:
score(ei) =
Kÿ
j=1
fnormi,j (4)
As shown in Figure 5, we visualize the entities with the
highest scores as a set of circles, each of a diameter
proportional to the score of the corresponding entity.
Di erent types of entities (e.g., people, places, etc.) have
di erent circle color.
ii. Concepts: We also extract concept tags from users’
documents. These concepts are high-level abstractions,
not necessarily mentioned in the text. AlchemyAPI was
again used for this task, returning, for each file TFj , a
set of concepts, each denoted as ci along with a relevance
score ri,j œ [0, 1]. We used the following scoring method
to rank the concepts across the user’s documents:
score(ci) =
Kÿ
j=1
ri,j (5)
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies ; 2016 (4):141–144
0
5
10
15
20
1e+03 1e+05 1e+07
Installations count
N
um
be
r o
f A
pp
s
Fig. 16. Distribution of the
app installation counts (on
a log scale) in the reviewed
dataset
0
5
10
15
20
100 10000
Ratings count
N
um
be
r o
f A
pp
s
Fig. 17. Distribution of the
app rating counts (on a log
scale) in the reviewed dataset
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 1 2 3 4 5
App Rating
N
um
be
r o
f A
pp
s
Fig. 18. Distribution of the
app rating values in the re-
viewed dataset
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
% of textual user files
D
en
si
ty
Fig. 19. Density plot of the
percentage of textual files for
our experiment’s users
Similar to the case of entities, we represent concepts by
circles, each of a diameter proportional to the score of
the concept.
iii. Topics: Topics are used to classify documents into
high-level categories, such as technology, art, business,
etc. We used AlchemyAPI, which returns a maximum
of 3 topics per file TFj (each denoted as ti), along
with a relevance score ri,j œ [0, 1] for each of them.
A topic comes in the form of “a1/a2/ . . . /an”, repre-
senting a hierarchy among the labels (e.g., “/hobbies
and interests/astrology” or “/finance/investing/venture
capital”). In order to extract the top topics based on a
user’s documents, we use the same scoring method as
that of concepts:
score(ti) =
Kÿ
j=1
ri,j (6)
We represent topics by circles, similar to the case of
entities, where the diameter of a circle is proportional
to the score of the topic. Topics sharing the top level
label are colored similarly.
Sentiments: For each entity that occurs in TF , it is
possible to also estimate whether the text relays a pos-
itive, neutral, or negative sentiment about that entity.
Towards that end, we use the sentiment analysis service
of AlchemyAPI. For each TFi, we select the entities la-
beled with positive or negative sentiments (each such
entity also has a sentiment score si,j œ [≠1, 1] with 1
corresponding to the most positive sentiment and -1 to
the most negative one.). We then compute the overall
sentiment score si of entity ei across the all the user
documents TF :
si =
Kÿ
j=1
si,j (7)
The sentiments with the highest positive and negative
scores are then shown to the user, as was presented in
Figure 6.
Top Collaborators:We define collaborators as people
who share files with the user, regardless of who initiates
the sharing operation. In the interface, this insight is
visualized as a horizontal bar chart of the top collab-
orators with the bar lengths representing the relative
frequency of the user’s collaboration with each of them
(an instance of this visual appears in Figure 25 in the
context of our experiment).
Shared Interests: In this insight, we try to represent
the user’s mutual topics of interests with a group of peo-
ple. Towards that end, we perform the following steps:
– We determine the top topics as we have done in the
ECT insight.
– Then we select from these topics a subset St that
only includes the ones which appeared in shared
files.
– Via Google Drive API, we extract, for each topic
ti, a list U(ti) of collaborators (based on files it ap-
peared in).
– We select from each U(ti) the most frequent col-
laborators (i.e., those appearing in most documents
with this topic).
Users then get a visualization similar to Figure 7, where
we show the three top topics from St along with the top
collaborators for these topics.
Faces with Context: This insight shows a group of
faces, representing the most frequent people appearing
in the user’s images, alongside the concepts that appear
in the same images. In order to achieve it, we performed
two steps:
i. Face clustering: It is evident that showing the user
random faces detected in her photos will not create the
same e ect as when these faces are actually people she
cares about. Our plan to achieve the latter case involves
three steps:
– We use a face clustering algorithm in order to group
together photos of the same person. As a result, we
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies ; 2016 (4):142–144
0
10
20
30
40
50
BL DP IM FR
Experiment Group
Co
un
t
Answer
No
Yes
Fig. 20. Q: I understand
what the di erent Google
permissions mean.
0
10
20
30
40
50
BL DP IM FR
Experiment Group
Co
un
t
Answer
No
Yes
Fig. 21. Q: I found the in-
terface in these missions in-
tuitive.
get a list of groups G, where each group Gi œ G is
comprised of the faces that belong to a person iden-
tified as pi. The algorithm used is by Zhu et al., [26]
implemented by the OpenBR framework. [19]
– From each group Gi, we exclude the faces with
width (height) less than 115 of the total image width
(height).
– We exclude groups with less than 3 faces in total.
– We sort the groups by the number of faces in each
of them.
ii. Image concept recognition: In order to identify the
concepts inside each photo, we used a classifier from the
Ca e library [17]. The classifier uses a pre-built deep
learning network, that is based on the architecture used
by Krizhevsky et al., [20] that won the Imagenet 2012
contest.
Based on the above, we show the user the top groups
(i.e. with most faces) along with the most recurring con-
cepts in these groups (as in Figure 8).
Faces on Map: This insight (shown in Figure 9), con-
sists of showing the faces of people overlaid on a map,
centered at the geographical area where these faces ap-
peared. Below the map is a list of the top concepts that
appeared in the photos taken in that area. In our ac-
tual implementation, the visual is animated, moving be-
tween di erent areas to show the user the places that
di erent photos were taken at. In order to construct this
visualization, we had to cluster the images into di er-
ent geographical areas. For that, we used the OPTICS
algorithm (Ordering Points to Identify the Clustering
Structure) by Ankerst et al., [4]. OPTICS allows find-
ing density-based clusters in spatial data and is tailored
for detecting meaningful clusters with data of varying
density. After getting the cluster results, the zoom level
on the map is animated to show one cluster to the user
at a time.
C Further Experimental Details
Figure 19 shows the density plot for the percentage of
textual files in the user’s Google Drive (out of both im-
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age and textual files). Although there is a large fraction
of users with no image files, there are many users with
a balanced fraction of textual and image files. Figure 26
shows the task interface given to users during the exper-
iment, as explained in Section 5.1. Users read the task
goal and select the highlighted app. Then they are di-
rected to a permissions interface corresponding to their
group. Figures 24 and 25 show screenshots of the inter-
face for the FR and IM experimental groups. The cases
of BL and DP groups are similar to Figures 1 and 3,
with the addition of a decision dialog on top.
D Survey
Each user who completed the experiment was presented
with a set of multiple choice survey questions, in ad-
dition to a free form to provide feedback at the end.
In the following, we discuss the most important re-
sults based on users’ answers. Figure 20 shows that al-
though the majority of users understand what the text
of the di erent Google permissions means, at least one-
fourth of users expressed that they do not fully under-
stand these permissions. Figure 21 allowed us to verify
whether the experimental permission interfaces were in-
tuitive to the users. More than 90% of users answered
a rmatively, indicating that our experiments’ interface
was user-friendly. Figure 22 showed that the users in
the FR group were the ones that expressed the most
surprise at what the apps can know about them, which
is justified given the low Acceptance Likelihood in this
group. Finally, more than 90% of users (and 100% of the
FR group) expressed interest in using a similar interface
to the one they saw in the experiment (Figure 23). Over-
all, the survey results were in line with the experimen-
tal findings. Furthermore, surveyed users expressed the
interest in “adding recommendations for whether one
should install 3rd party apps”, in “implementing simi-
lar functionalities in the Google Play Store and iOS App
Store”, and in “highlighting apps that actually misbehave
rather than only the over-privileged ones”. These ideas
can potentially be realized in future works.
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Fig. 24. Example of the interface shown to users of the IM group, with the decision dialog on top
Fig. 25. Example of the interface shown to users of the FR group, with the decision dialog on top
Fig. 26. Task interface presented for the users in the experiment,
where they had to select the app satisfying the given purpose (already highlighted for them)
